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Abstract—High penetration of renewable energy source
makes microgrid (MGs) be environment friendly. However,
the stochastic input from renewable energy resource brings
difficulty in balancing the energy supply and demand. Pur-
chasing extra energy from macrogrid to deal with energy
shortage will increase MG energy cost. To mitigate inter-
mittent nature of renewable energy, energy trading and
energy storage which can exploit diversity of renewable
energy generation across space and time are efficient and
cost-effective methods. But current energy storage control
action will impact the future control action which brings
challenge to energy management. In addition, due to MG
participating energy trading as prosumer, it calls for an
efficient trading mechanism. Therefore, this paper focuses
on the problem of MG energy management and trading.
Energy trading problem is formulated as a stochastic
optimization one with both individual profit and social wel-
fare maximization. Firstly a Lyapunov optimization based
algorithm is developed to solve the stochastic problem.
Secondly the double-auction based mechanism is provided
to attract MGs’ truthful bidding for buying and selling
energy. Through theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that
individual MG can achieve a time average energy cost
close to offline optimum with tradeoff between storage
capacity and energy trading cost. Meanwhile the social
welfare is also asymptotically maximized under double
auction. Simulation results based on real world data show
the effectiveness of our algorithm.
Index Terms—Renewable energy, Lyapunov optimiza-
tion, Double auction
I. INTRODUCTION
GROWING attentions to the environment anddemands of electricity promote the power grid
modernizing. A microgrid (MG) is a distributed
Z. Qiao, B. Yang, C. Chen, Q. Xu, F. Xiong, C. Chen and X.
Guan are with the Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, Shanghai, 200240 P. R.
Z. Qiao, B. Yang, C. Chen, Q. Xu, F. Xiong, C. Chen and X. Guan
are also with Collaborative Innovation Center for Advanced Ship
and Deep-Sea Exploration, Shanghai, China and Key Laboratory of
System Control and Information Processing, Ministry of Education
of China, Shanghai, China
B. Chen is with Shanghai Electric Group Co., Ltd Central
Academe, Shanghai, China.
system equipped with renewable energy sources
which can reduce greenhouse gas emission. How-
ever stochastic variations of energy produced by
renewable energy sources make MG be hard to
achieve balance between energy supply and de-
mand. The risk of single MG to meet certain op-
erational objective (e.g. minimizing energy costs)
is very high. A popular technique to compensate
for stochastic renewable energy generation is energy
storage which can buff energy and copy with future
energy shortage. However, with deeper integration
of renewable energy resources, increasing storage
capacity is no longer a cost-effective method.
As a result, the need for more cost-effective
solutions has motivated studies of energy trading
between interconnected MGs [1]. Geographical dis-
tributed MGs have chance to increase overall prof-
its by trading due to diversity of energy genera-
tion. Nevertheless MGs are energy providers and
consumers. Even more MG needs to make some
important decisions: whether use more energy to
serve their own loads, energy charging or trading?
How much money should be charged for per unit
energy? These decisions and question are critical to
the economics of MG. These decisions should be
efficiently and optimally made in an online fashion,
which can help MG to get profit from trading
without decreasing user experience and guarantee
long-term optimality of individual MG profit, as
well as the social welfare.
In this paper, we deal with MG energy manage-
ment and trading problem considering both stochas-
tic renewable energy and random power demands.
First, we present a Lyapunov-optimization based al-
gorithm to help MG to calculate prices and amounts
of energy for trading. Lyapunov-optimization can
achieve a result which is close to offline opti-
mum without specific probability distribution of re-
newable energy generation and customer demands.
Then a double-auction based trading mechanism is
proposed for interconnected MGs energy trading
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2in which no MG can be benefit from untruthful
bidding. In particular, our main contributions of this
paper are as follows:
• From the perspective of MGs, we model a
comprehensive MG mainly including renew-
able energy and energy storage in a energy
trading market. Then we propose a two-stage
energy trading mechanism which is economic
efficient, individual rational, balanced budge
and truthfulness to minimize the individual cost
of MG and maximize social welfare by energy
trading.
• We combine a double auction scheme with
stochastic Lyapunov optimization based algo-
rithm for interconnected MGs trading. Each
MG can price energy based on the current
status of customer demands and energy stor-
age without future renewable energy generation
information. Thus double auction mechanism
can guarantee more profits than that when MG
operates alone.
• Through theoretical analysis, our algorithm can
achieve better trade-off among energy trading,
energy storage capacity and customers dissat-
isfaction index. Additionally, energy trading
will not cause profit loss of MG. Moreover,
by using practical data sets, we prove the
effectiveness of our proposed algorithm.
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss the
system model and double auction framework in
Section III. Then, in Section IV, we propose a solu-
tion based on Lyapunov optimization for the former
problem,and prove the theoretical performance of
this method. Numerical results are in Section V and
conclusion is in the Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
There has been some recent researches in en-
ergy trading between MGs. References [2] and [3]
consider an individual MG operation with energy
storage and renewable energy source. However, MG
operated without cooperation will waste some of
renewable energy due to limit energy storage ca-
pacity. In [1], cooperation allows MG to borrow
energy from other MGs which have extra energy.
Iterative double auction is introduced into trading
in [4] and [5]. Auction mechanism ensures the
participants benefit from cooperation and trading
when auctioneer get complete information of MG
Fig. 1: Energy trading within interconnected micro-
grids through an auction process
current status. Reference [6] adjusts double auction
mechanism for another scenario called inter-cloud
trading. The algorithm can reach asymptotical so-
cial welfare maximization with limited information
which can protect individual cloud privacy. Never-
theless, a energy trading framework applied within
MGs should be developed. MG will attend the
trading with considering renewable energy, energy
storage and customer demands.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DOUBLE AUCTION
FRAMEWORK
A. System Model
We consider an inter-connected power grid con-
sisting of n microgrids (MGs) and a macro-grid as
shown in Fig. 1. The MGs are capable of harvesting
renewable energy (e.g. wind, solar energy etc.). In
addition, the MGs are equipped with energy storage
in which they can store the harvested energy for
future use.
1) Energy Generation and Purchase: MGi har-
vests Ri(t) units of energy during one time slot
t. One time slot typically is half or one hour,
we assume one time slot as one hour in order to
coordinate with simulation. Renewable energy is
first stored in the energy storage before it can be
used in next time slot. The macrogrid generates the
energy in the traditional way. We assume that the
macrogrid has a very large energy generation in one
time slot (which means we do not need to consider
any macrogrid energy generation constraints). MGi
purchases Gi(t) units of energy from macrogrid
with price P (t).
32) Energy Storage: Each MG has storage which
can store extra energy. The energy in the storage can
be considered as a queue Bi(t). Renewable energy
used for charging denote as Ci(t) which means en-
ergy enter the storage queue, meanwhile discharging
Di(t) means the energy leaving the storage queue.
Then we can have following equation:
Bi(t+ 1) = Bi(t)−Di(t) + Ci(t) (1)
To be specific, the energy storage has a lot of
constraints. Firstly, we do not allow charging and
discharging happen simultaneously:
1Ci(t)>0 + 1Di(t)>0 ≤ 1 (2)
1f(x)>0 =
{
1 if f(x) > 0
0 otherwise
Energy storage has finite capacity:
0 ≤ Bi(t) ≤ Bmaxi (3)
where Bmaxi is energy storage capacity. There are
maximum charging rate Cmaxi and discharging rate
Dmaxi . Energy charging and discharging have to
follow energy storage safety constraints:
0 ≤ Ci(t) ≤ min[Bmaxi −Bi(t), Cmaxi (t)] (4)
0 ≤ Di(t) ≤ min[Bi(t), Dmaxi (t)] (5)
TABLE I
THE INPUT QUANTITIES AND INTER-
MEDIATE VARIABLES
Ri(t) Amount of energy harvest by MGi in
time slot t.
Gi(t) Amount of energy purchased by MGi
from macrogrid in time slot t.
XJi (t) Energy purchased from auction for
MGi in time slot t.
Pi(t) Price pay for per unit power from
macrogrid, slot t
Ii(t) The delay-intolerant load demands ar-
rived at the MGi, slot t
Ti(t) The delay-tolerant load demands ar-
rived at the MGi, slot t
Bi(t) The amount of power stored in the
battery of MGi, slot t
Di(t) Amount of energy discharged from
MGi energy storage in time slot t.
Ci(t) The power charging to the battery at
the MGi, slot t
Ji(t) The power serve delay-tolerant load at
the MGi, slot t
Qi(t) Length of queue buffering of delay-
tolerant jobs at MGi, slot t
Zi(t) Length of virtual queue at MGi, slot
t
εi Set by users denote as user delay
aware coefficient
3) Load Service: The users of MGi have delay-
intolerant (DI) Ii(t) and delay-tolerant (DT) load
demands Ti(t). DI load demands need to be served
when they come such as lighting. DT load demands
should be served before a certain deadline like using
washing machine and dish-wisher. In addition, we
assume that both Ii(t) and Ti(t) are an indepen-
dent and identically distributed random (i.i.d) non-
negative stochastic process, and 0 ≤ Ti(t) ≤ Tmaxi .
Now we define the Qi(t) as the length of queue
buffering of delay-tolerant jobs at MGi on time
t and Ji(t) as the energy including both energy
generation and purchase allocated to serve the DT
load demands, then Qi(t) is according to following
equation:
Qi(t+ 1) = max[Qi(t)− Ji(t), 0] + Ti(t) (6)
The DT load demands can be delayed, but users
still feel uncomfortable when these demands cannot
be served. So we denote Zi(t) as delay aware queue
as follow [7] :
Zi(t+ 1) = max[Zi(t)− Ji(t), 0] + εi1Qi(t)>0 (7)
No matter how, harvested energy must exceed
energy demands, then we have:
Ii(t) + Ji(t) +
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
yˆil(t) + Ci(t) ≤ Ri(t)+
Gi(t) +Di(t) +
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
xˆil(t)
(8)
where xij(t) is the amount of energy bought by MGi
from MGl, and yij(t) is the amount of energy sold
from MGi to MGl . Since we want storage queue
can be used in Lyapunov optimization technique, we
formulate a virtual energy storage queue as follow:
Xi(t) = Bi(t)−Θi −Dmaxi (9)
where Θi will be specified later.
4TABLE II
THE VARIABLES ABOUT DOUBLE
AUCTION
βi(t) The price of buying per unit energy
by MGi, slot t
αi(t) The price of selling per unit energy
from MGi, slot t
βˆ(t) Actual price of buying per unit energy,
slot t
αˆ(t) Actual price of selling per unit energy,
slot t
xij(t) The amount of energy bought by the
MGi to MGl, slot t
yij(t) The amount of energy sold from MGi
to MGl, slot t
xˆij(t) The actual amount of energy bought
by the MGi to MGl, slot t
yˆij(t) The actual amount of energy sold
from MGi to MGl, slot t
βmini The minimum price that MGi can get
a unit of energy. It should cover all
necessary infrastructure costs
ρ1, ρ2 Set by Auctioneer measure the maxi-
mum energy can trade in the auction
B. Problem Formulation
1) Microgrid Time Average Cost Minimization
Problem: The MGs want to cost less, meanwhile
they can serve more demands. Firstly, we define
energy expenditure Ui(t) as follow:
Ui(t) = P (t)Gi(t) +
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
βˆ(t)xˆil(t)
−
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
αˆ(t)yˆil(t)
(10)
where βˆ(t) and αˆ(t) is actual price of selling and
buying one unit of energy in double auction.
Then the time average cost minimization problem
is shown below:
P1 : min lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{Ui(t)} (11)
subject to:
(1)-(9)
where the expectation is with regard to the ran-
dom process in the system, control action and
Fig. 2: The decision making process
energy price. During each time slot, the deci-
sion variables are Ci(t), Di(t), Ji(t), Gi(t) and
αi(t), β(t), yil(t), xil(t) (∀j 6= i).
2) Double Auction Framework: We want to use
double auction to motivate MGs to take part in
the electricity market. We show the social welfare
maximization problem P2:
P2 : max
i′∑
i=1
l′∑
l=1
(ρ1βi′(t)log(xil(t))−ρ2αl′(t)y
2
li(t)
2
)
(12)
subject to:
xil(t) = yli(t)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , i′}, ∀l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l′} (13)
Pi(t) ≥ βi′(t) > αl′(t) (14)
where βi′(t) and αl′(t) are the sell-bid and buy-
bid which may get accepted at time t. Constraint
(13) makes sure the energy balance in the electricity
market and both MGs and macrogrid can benefit
from auction due to (14). The decision variables are
βi′(t) and αl′(t)
3) Discussion of the System Model: We now
illustrate some notice on the system model.
• We assume the energy bought by MGs from
auction only can serve their load demands.
In other words, the energy got from auction
cannpot be charged into the energy storage
and MGs cannot use energy bought from auc-
tion for further trading. In practice, we need
consider about the efficiency of charging and
discharging energy. If we put the charging and
discharging efficiency into the system model,
5we will find that the possibility of purchasing
energy for further trading is little. This more
complicated model with physical model will
be considered in the further work.
• Transferring energy between the MGs will
cause energy loss. However, the energy loss
can be considered in our model which can be
interpreted as a higher price which can cover
the energy loss. Moreover MGs may use DC
power line connection in the future, it will cost
less energy than the traditional methods. So
we ignore the energy loss caused by energy
exchanging [1].
• All MGs in our system model are selfish and
rational. It means they only want to maximize
their own profit and minimize their cost. They
also want to fulfill customer demands as much
as possible.
IV. ALGORITHM
We next present a Lyapunov optimization based
algorithm to solve P1 and get optimization problem
P3 in Part A. Then we show this algorithm theo-
retical analysis and MG energy valuation and bids
in Part B. In Part C, we design a double auction-
mechanism for MG trading, which is economic
efficient, individual rational, balanced budge and
truthfulness and reformulate the P2 into P4.
A. Lyapunov optimization based Problem1
Firstly, we need to define the Lyapunov function
as
Li(t) =
1
2
(Q2i (t) +X
2
i (t) + Z
2
i (t))
The one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift can be
defined as
4 (Li(t)) = E{Li(t+ 1)− Li(t)|−→K i(t)} (15)
And devote a vector
−→
K i(t) = (Qi(t), Xi(t), Zi(t))
At last we can formulate P3
P3 : min Xi(t)(Ci(t)−Di(t))
− Ji(t)(Qi(t) + Zi(t)) + ViUi(t)
subject to: lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{Ci(t)}
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{Di(t)}
0 ≤ Ci(t) ≤ Cmaxi (t)
0 ≤ Di(t) ≤ Dmaxi (t)
Ii(t) + Ji(t) +
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
yˆil(t) + Ci(t) ≤ Ri(t)
+Gi(t) +Di(t) +
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
xˆil(t)
(16)
Then we can have following Lemma.
Lemma 1: Given 4(Li(t)) shown in (16)
We can have:
4 (Li(t)) + ViE{Ui(t)|−→K i(t)}
≤ Ai + E{Xi(t)(Ci(t)−Di(t))|−→K i(t)}
+ E{Qi(t)(Ti(t)− Ji(t))|−→K i(t)}
+ E{Zi(t)(εi(t)− Ji(t))|−→K i(t)}
+ Vi(E{Ui(t)|−→K i(t)})
(17)
where Ai is the constant i.e.,
Ai =
(εmaxi )
2+(Jmaxi )
2
2
+
max[(Cmaxi )
2,(Dmaxi )
2]
2
+
(Jmaxi )
2+(Tmaxi )
2
2
Proof: At first, we can get following equation
according (16)
1) Q
2
i (t+1)−Q2i (t)
2
≤ J2i (t)+T 2i (t)
2
+ Qi(t)(Ti(t) −
Ji(t))
≤ (Jmaxi )2+(Tmaxi )2
2
+Qi(t)(Ti(t)− Ji(t))
2) X
2
i (t+1)−X2i (t)
2
≤ (Ci(t)−Di(t))2
2
+ Xi(t)(Ci(t) −
Di(t)) ≤ max[(C
max
i )
2,(Dmaxi )
2]
2
+ Xi(t)(Ci(t)−
Di(t))
3) Z
2
i (t+1)−Z2i (t)
2
≤ ε2i (t)+J2i (t)
2
+Zi(t)(εi(t)−Ji(t))
≤ (εmaxi )2+(Jmaxi )2
2
+ Zi(t)(εi(t)− Ji(t))
Next we can get:
64(Li(t)) + ViE{Ui(t)|−→K i(t)}
≤ (εmaxi )2+(Jmaxi )2
2
+
max[(Cmaxi )
2,(Dmaxi )
2]
2
+
(Jmaxi )
2+(Tmaxi )
2
2
+ E{Xi(t)(Ci(t)−Di(t))|−→K i(t)}
+ E{Qi(t)(Ti(t)− Ji(t))|−→K i(t)}
+ E{Zi(t)(εi(t)− Ji(t))|−→K i(t)}
+ Vi(E{Ui(t)|−→K i(t)})
Then the (17) directly follow.
Because Ai + E{Zi(t)εi(t) + Qi(t)Ti(t)} cannot
change when the slot t begin and we need to
minimize the right-hand of (17) and .Then we
reformulate the P3,we can get P4
P4 :min Xi(t)(Ci(t)−Di(t))
− Ji(t)(Qi(t) + Zi(t))
+ ViUi(t)
(18)
We denote C∗i (t), D
∗
i (t), J
∗
i (t), G
∗
i (t) and αi(t),
βi(t), RJi (t), X
J
i (t) as solution corresponding to
(15). RJi (t) is the total energy that MGs can sell
in time slot t and XJi (t) is the energy that MGs
want from energy trading in time slot t.
Lemma 2: If MGs are rational and truthful, then:
αi(t) =
Qi(t) + Zi(t)
Vi
(19)
βi(t) =
{
Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
≥ βmini
βmini otherwise
(20)
Respectively, the true values of the amount of
energy to buy and to sell at MGi are:
RJi (t) =
{
Ri(t)− Ii(t) if αi(t) > Qi(t)+Zi(t)Vi
0 otherwise
(21)
XJi (t) =
{
Jmaxi −Ri(t) if βi(t) < Qi(t)+Zi(t)Vi
0 otherwisep
(22)
Proof. We prove the Lemma2 depending on
different cases
Case 1. The buy-bid win, but sell-bid doesn’t.
Then P4 transform into
E{Xi(t)(Ci(t) − Di(t)Ti)}E{Ji(t)(Qi(t) +
Zi(t)Ti)} + ViE{P (t)Gi(t) +∑N
l=1,l 6=i βˆ(t)xˆil(t)}
When Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
≥ βmini
If βi(t) >
Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
, the MGs tend to decrease
Ji(t) which means decreasing
∑N
l=1,l 6=i xˆil(t)
and minimize P4.
If βi(t) <
Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
, the MGs tend to increase
Ji(t) which means increasing
∑N
l=1,l 6=i xˆil(t)
and minimize P4.
If βi(t) =
Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
, the cost of per-unit
energy and desire of fulfilling DT load
demands are balance. So βi(t) =
Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
can reveal the true desire of MGi. When
Qi(t)+Zi(t)
Vi
< βmini
Then βi = βmini
Case 2. The sell-bid win, but buy-bid
doesn’t. Similar to the former Case,we
can know:αi(t) =
Qi(t)+Zi(T )
Vi
Case 3. Both sell-bid and buy-bid are accepted.
We have constraint βi(t) > αi(t), but as a
rational MG, βi(t) < αi(t). So this case is
contradicted and cannot happen in a well-
designed Double Auction.
Case 4. Neither sell-bid nor buy-bid is ac-
cepted.
Then P4 turn into E{Xi(t)(Ci(t)−Di(t)Ti)}−
E{Ji(t)(Qi(t) + Zi(t)Ti)} + ViE{P (t)Gi(t)}
The sell-bid and buy-bid don’t have effect.
MGs need more economic incentive to sell their
renewable energy when they buffer lots of demands
. In addition, they are willing to get energy with a
higher bids.
After auction, algorithm can solve the
linear programming problem (18) and get
C∗i (t), D
∗
i (t), J
∗
i (t), G
∗
i (t).
B. Algorithm Analysis
In this section, we summarize the properties of
our algorithm as follows:
Theorem 1. All Vi in (16) should meet the con-
straints that 0 < Vi < V maxi for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }
V maxi =
Bmaxi − Tmaxi − εmaxi
Pmax − Pmini
(23)
Then our Lyapunov optimization based Problem1
has the following properities:
1) Both Qi(t) and Zi(t) are upper bounded by
Qmaxi and Z
max
i at all slot t,where
Qmaxi = ViP
max + Tmaxi (24)
Zmaxi = ViP
max + εmaxi (25)
Further here we denote Qi(t) + Zi(t) upper
bound as Θi
Θi = ViP
max + Tmaxi + ε
max
i (26)
72) we denote the worst-case delay as δmaxi ,where
δmaxi =
Qmaxi + Z
max
i
εi
=
2ViP
max + Tmaxi + ε
max
i
εi
(27)
3) According the definition of virtual queue
Xi(t)
−Θi −Dmaxi ≤ Xi(t) ≤ Bmaxi −Θi −Dmaxi
(28)
4) If ∀i, Ri(t), Ii(t) and Ti(t) are i.i.d, then time-
average-cost is shown below
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{P (t)Gi(t) +
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
βˆ(t)xˆil(t)
−
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
αˆ(t)yˆil(t)} ≤ P ∗1 +
Ai
Vi
(29)
Proof.We set Qi(0), Zi(0) and Xi(0) satisfying all
these constraints, then we use induction to prove
equation above.
1) If 0 < Qi(t) ≤ ViPmax, then Qi(t) ≤
V Pmax + Tmaxi
If Qi(t) ≥ ViPmax, because Zi(t) ≥ 0,∀t ∈
[0, 1, 2, · · · ] and our target is to minimize the
P4. We can find −(Qi(t)+Zi(t))+ViPmax ≤
0. It means no matter how, increasing GJi (t)
can still minimize P4. So we choose GJi (t) =
GJ,maxi , then P4 can be minimized. According
(6), Qi(t + 1) ≤ ViPmax + Tmaxi − Jmaxi ≤
ViP
max + Tmaxi
To sum up, Qmaxi = ViP
max + Tmaxi , Z
max
i
and Θi can be proven similarly.
2) Then we will prove the worst-case delay
δmaxi by contradiction
Zi(t+ 1) ≥ Zi(t)− Ji(t) + εi1Qi(t)>0
So Zi(t0 + 1 + δmaxi ) − Zi(t0) ≥
−∑t0+δmaxit=t0 Ji(t) + εiδmaxi
Due to Zi(t0 + 1 + δmaxi ) ≤ Zmaxi and
Zi(t0) > 0
Rearrange the terms∑t0+δmaxi
t=t0 Ji ≥ εiδmaxi − Zmaxi
We assume the DT load demands came
in at slot t0 and cannot be served at slot
t0 + 1 + δ
max
i , So
∑t0+δmaxi
t=t0 Ji ≤ Qmaxi
Then Qmaxi ≥ εiδmaxi − Zmaxi , rearrange the
equation and use contradiction. We can get:
δmaxi =
Qmaxi +Z
max
i
εi
=
2ViP
max+Tmaxi +ε
max
i
εi
3) To be specify that βmini as the minimum price
that MGi can get a unit of energy.
When t=0, Xi(0) = Bi(0)−Θi −Dmaxi
< Bmaxi −Θi −Dmaxi
If Bmaxi −Θi−Dmaxi ≥ Xi(t) > 0, according
to the P4, DJi (t) > 0, Ci(t) = 0. Then Bmaxi −
Θi −Dmaxi ≥ Xi(t) > Xi(t+ 1)
If 0 ≥ Xi(t) > −ViPmin, then
−Θi −Dmaxi < −V Pmin −Dmaxi <
Xi(t+1) < Xi(t)+C
max
i < B
max
i −Θi−Dmaxi
Here we use the condition:
Vi <
Bmaxi −Tmaxi −εmaxi
Pmax−Pmini
If −ViPmax ≥ Xi(t) > −Θi −Dmaxi , accord-
ing P4, Ci > 0, Di = 0. Battery is charging.
Then Xi(t+ 1) > Xi(t) > −Θi −Dmaxi
To sum up, −Θ − Dmaxi ≤ Xi(t) ≤ Bmaxi −
Θ−Dmaxi
4)
∑T−1
t=0 ViE{Ui(t)|
−→
K i(t)} ≤ ViP ∗1 T +
E{Li(T − 1)} − E{Li(0)}+BiT
Dividing both sides by ViT , letting T → ∞,
and using the condition that E{Li(T − 1)}
and E{Li(0)} are finite. Then:
limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 E{P (t)Gi(t) +∑N
l=1,l 6=i βˆ(t)xˆil(t)−
∑N
l=1,l 6=i αˆ(t)yˆil(t)} ≤
P ∗1 +
Ai
Vi
Theorem 1 implies that time average individual
MG energy cost can be made close to offline
optimum by increasing the value of Vi. However,
this results in increasing customers dissatisfaction
index Qmaxi , Z
max
i , δ
max
i and cost of energy storage
capacity Bmaxi .
C. Double Auction
Double Auction Mechanism has two steps:
• MGs decide the sell-bid and buy-bid. In addi-
tion, MGs should submit the amount of energy
they need or supply.
• Auctioneer calculates according to P2 and an-
nounces the accepted sell-bid and buy-bid, and
the amount of energy that MG gets from or
offer to the electricity can be determined.
In Section 2.2, we illustrate P2. We show the
double auction mechanism in this section.
The auctioneer sorts all received buy-bids from MGs
in descending order and sell-bids from MGs in
ascending order in the sell prices:
β1(t) ≥ β2(t) ≥ · · · ≥ βn(t) and α1(t) ≤ α2(t) ≤
· · · ≤ αn(t)
8Next we reformulate P2 into P5 based on new
conditions:
P5 : max
i∑
i=1
l∑
l=1
(ρ1βi(t)log(xil(t))−ρ2αl(t)
y2li(t)
2
)
(30)
subject to:
xil(t) = yli(t)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , i},∀l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l} (31)
where ρ1, ρ2 are set by auctioneer to control energy
trading. In order to maximize P5, we can estimate
xil(t) = yli(t) is close to
√
ρ1βi(t)
ρ2αl(t)
.
We assume βi∗(t) and αl∗(t) as the solution to
the P5, then βi∗−1(t) and αl∗−1(t) will be accepted
by the auctioneer. βi∗(t) and αl∗(t) can be solved
by Lagrangian mechanic [8].
The actual values of the buy/sell prices for MGi
can be derived as:
βˆi(t) =
{
βi∗(t) if βi(t) wins
0 otherwise
(32)
and
αˆi(t) =
{
αl∗(t) if αi(t) wins
0 otherwise (33)
The optimal amount of energy purchased from
MGl by MGi is:
xˆil(t) =
{
wx(t) · xil(t) if bid βi(t) win
0 otherwise (34)
The optimal amount of energy sold from MGi to
MGl is:
yˆil(t) =
{
wy(t) · yil(t) if bid αi(t) win
0 otherwise (35)
where wx(t) and wy(t) are the coefficients which
can ensure (31).
Theorem 3. Using the mechanism presented
above, all MGs will submit the sell-bids and
buy-bids truthfully, or they will get lower profit by
deviating from the true value of the buy and sell
bids in (19) and (20)
Proof. This proof is similar to Theorem2 in [6],
which is omitted here for brevity.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results based
on the data from the real world to examine our
algorithm in the previous sections.
(a) Power Generated by microgrids
(b) Price for energy from macrogrid
Fig. 3: Data from Other Web-sites
A. Experimental Setup
We consider a network of five MGs, namely
MG1, MG2, MG3, MG4, MG5 and MG6. Each
MG includes renewable energy generation, energy
storage, delay-intolerant loads and delay-tolerant
loads. There are two types MGs. All MGs have
DT and DI loads which are i.i.d. First type of
MG (indexed by i=1,2,3) loads take value from
[100,200] kWh uniformly at random. Second type
of microgird (indexed by i=4,5,6) loads take value
from [200,400] kWh uniformly at random. For the
renewable energy generation, we use hourly average
wind speed data provided by the Alternative Energy
Institute (AEI) [9]. Specifically, we choose the scal-
ing factors such that the average wind-driven energy
production during one slot is about 200 kWh for
type-1 MGs and 600 kWh for type-2 MGs. Detailed
data are shown in Fig.3(a). For the price purchasing
energy from macrogrids, we use hourly energy price
provided by the Power Smart Pricing administered
for Ameren Illinois data [10]. The detail statistics
are shown in Fig.3(b). The total length of data is
120 hours. The maximum storage capacity of both
types MGs is 3MW.
In addition, the maximum charging and discharg-
ing rate of all MGs are 1.5MWh. Let Vi = V maxi
and εi = Tmini . At last, both type-1 and type-2 MG
βmini = 1.
The auctioneer sets ρ1 = 1000 and ρ2 = 0.0001
which can make sure the most of bid can accepted
9Fig. 4: Cost of all microgrids on each slot
Fig. 5: Total energy purchased from macrogrid on
each slot
in the auction.
B. Results
We show energy cost of all MGs on each time
slot with our algorithm and without double auction
mechanism in Fig.4. When MGs face renewable
energy shortage like time slot 63 − 70, double
auction can reduce MG costs compared to individ-
ual MG operation. Although MG has to purchase
extra energy from macrogrid to satisfy DT load
demands after renewable energy shortage like time
slot 40 − 50, the average energy expenditure of
all MGs are less than the situation without double
auction and reduces about 11.3%. In addition, our
algorithm can ensure a certain delay of DT load
demands.
Using double auction allow the MGs to exchange
their extra renewable energy and purchase less en-
ergy from macrogrids. Fig.5 illustrates the energy
purchased by all MGs from the macrogrids. In
the most of slots, MGs using our algorithm need
less energy from macrogrids and it outperforms the
methods without double auction about 11.5%.
At last, if MGs can not make some profits in the
auction, they intend to store their extra energy into
their energy storage. When Bmaxi → ∞, MGs will
seldom exchange extra energy. The double auction
can motivate the MGs trading their energy into the
Fig. 6: Total energy exchanged between microgrids
markets. In Fig.6, even MGs have infinity capacity
energy storage, they still will exchange energy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates both individual-cost mini-
mization and social-welfare maximization strategies
at individual-selfish MGs in energy trading market.
We solve the time average cost minimization prob-
lem using Lyapunov optimization theory. Mean-
while, this algorithm can deal with stochastic prob-
lem brought by renewable energy generation and
calculate trading bids. Then we propose a economic
efficient, individual rational, balanced budge and
truthful trading algorithm named double auction. At
last, our results show that MGs energy expenditure
can be reduced by our algorithm. Our solution can
also be useful for MG designers to decide the
capacity of energy storage and cooperation in order
to meet certain energy expenditure criterion. In the
future, we will take the energy transmission and
energy charging efficiency into consideration. The
analysis of how these constraints take effect on the
energy trading and microgird energy management
is left for future investigation.
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